



Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies?:   
The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later 
 
Richard J. Gilbert







The Microsoft antitrust case focused public attention on the role of antitrust enforcement 
in preserving the forces of innovation in high-technology markets.  A May 15, 2000 Business 
Week article reported that ￿Innovation is King [at the antitrust Agencies].  Traditionally, 
regulators focused on whether on whether companies artificially hiked prices or reduced output.  
Now, they￿re increasingly likely to look first at whether corporate behavior aids or impedes 
innovation.￿   
In this article, we examine whether innovation has displaced short-term price effects as 
the focus of antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission and, to the extent that it has, whether enforcement actions are any different as a 
result.  We also ask whether enforcement actions in the area of intellectual property and 
innovation have been consistent with the 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property [IP Guidelines]
1.  Finally, we consider whether recent enforcement 
actions identify key areas in which additional guidance from the Agencies would be desirable.  
We address these questions first in merger cases and then in non-merger cases. 
Our investigation shows that in recent years the antitrust enforcement agencies have 
increasingly expressed concerns over the effects of particular mergers and firm conduct on 
innovation.  The agencies identified innovation effects as a reason to challenge a merger in 47 
cases over the period spanning the second half of the 1990s.  In the first half of that decade, the 
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agencies identified innovation as a cause to challenge a merger in only four cases.  The DOJ 
and the FTC also initiated several non-merger antitrust enforcement actions in the later half of 
the 1990s that alleged significant impacts on innovation. 
Although a large number of merger and non-merger enforcement actions brought by the 
agencies identified innovation effects, it is another question whether these actions actually 
turned on innovation issues.  In the merger area, our investigation shows that innovation 
concerns were decisive in only a few cases.  Most of the merger cases that alleged effects on 
innovation likely could have been challenged based on adverse impacts on competition in 
markets for existing goods and services.  We do not mean to imply that innovation impacts were 
unimportant in these cases.  Instead, we make the more limited point that the decisions to 
oppose these mergers likely would not have been different if innovation had been excluded 
from the analysis.  In a few additional cases, innovation concerns led to challenges in more 
markets, and therefore resulted in a broader remedy, than if innovation issues had not been 
considered. 
Several recent non-merger enforcement actions, in addition to Microsoft, have turned on 
innovation issues or on conduct involving intellectual property.  To a considerable extent these 
non-merger cases reflect competition issues raised by business arrangements that combine 
intellectual property rights or that settle disputes arising from interfering intellectual property 
rights.  Antitrust issues have been raised when a combination of intellectual property rights or a 
collective decision to support a particular industry standard creates or enhances market power, 
and when a settlement of an intellectual property dispute extends the life of a weak patent.  
Cases such as Microsoft and Visa-MasterCard have addressed the effects of industry structures 
and business arrangements on the pace of innovation.   
We conclude that innovation is not quite ￿King￿ at the antitrust agencies, although its 
role has become increasingly important and has been decisive in several merger and non-merger 
enforcement actions that have potentially very significant impacts for consumer welfare.  We 
also find that the approaches followed by the antitrust Agencies in these cases are generally 
consistent with the principles and policies described in the IP Guidelines, although we note 
several areas where additional guidance would be desirable. 
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In making these assessments, we emphasize that our investigation is guided by the facts 
as represented to us in public documents released by the antitrust Agencies.  Moreover, we add 
the disclaimer that, as individuals involved in the drafting of the IP Guidelines (as well as in 
some of the enforcement actions described in this paper), we are not entirely objective 
evaluators of the Guidelines￿ role in antitrust policy.  Nonetheless, we feel qualified to comment 
on the use of the IP Guidelines in antitrust enforcement and the value of additional guidance for 
antitrust policy related to innovation and intellectual property licensing. 
 
II.  KEY PRINCIPLES IN THE DOJ AND FTC GUIDELINES 
Before turning to whether a focus on innovation has made any difference to antitrust 
enforcement, we first pause to consider whether it should, and in what ways it might.  There is 
little doubt that technological innovation is a key driver of economic progress
2 and that an 
increase in the rate of technological change can offset the adverse impact on consumer welfare 
from supra-competitive prices.
3  Consequently, it is especially important that antitrust policy be 
formulated in a way that fosters rather than impedes such innovation.  That does not mean that 
antitrust policy need necessarily be different as a result.  However, high-technology markets do 
in fact differ from other markets in significant respects. In particular, high-technology markets 
are characterized by rapid rates of technological change, high fixed costs of research and 
development relative to the variable costs of production, knowledge spillovers, and (sometimes) 
strong ￿network effects.￿   
Rapid rates of technological change imply that the competitive significance of firms can 
change suddenly and drastically, with once dominant firms becoming marginalized by new 
technical developments in their fields.  The Department of Justice antitrust case against IBM 
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became largely moot as developments in small and personal computers undermined the 
economic significance of IBM￿s leadership in mainframe computing.
4 
The high fixed costs of R&D relative to marginal production costs also has potentially 
important ramifications for antitrust policy.  The model of perfect competition, which is the 
benchmark for traditional antitrust analysis, simply does not apply to many high-technology 
markets.  If product prices equal marginal production costs, many high-tech firms could not  
cover the costs necessary to invent and develop the products in the first place.  Put another way, 
market power, which is the ability to set price above marginal cost, is necessary to the survival 
of many high-technology industries. 
Knowledge spillovers also can be important for the structure and performance of high-
technology markets.  Firms that invest in research and development often create knowledge that 
benefits others, including their competitors.  Even strong intellectual property rights may be 
insufficient to capture a large share of the knowledge benefits from R&D.  Other ways to 
appropriate the benefits of knowledge are to have a large share of the production that the 
knowledge affects or to form alliances to share information.  If so, concentrated market 
structures and cooperation among competitors, traditionally antitrust evils to be avoided if 
possible, may benefit consumers. 
Yet another reason why high-technology markets may gravitate to concentrated market 
structures is the presence of strong ￿network effects,￿ which imply that the value of a product 
increases with the number of consumers that purchase the product (and with the number of 
firms that supply products and services that complement the product).
5  These network effects, 
like  other economies of scale, potentially  benefit  consumers.  However, the presence of 
network effects, combined with the costs of switching between incompatible networks, can 
raise high barriers to the entry of competing networks.
6 
For these reasons, high market concentration may be a natural state in high-technology 
markets.  In the extreme, the ￿Schumpeterian hypothesis￿ that large and dominant firms  
promote vigorous technological progress (named after Joseph Schumpeter, who championed 
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this view in 1942)
7 suggests a much more circumspect role for antitrust policy, which is 
traditionally premised on the benefits of competition.  Conversely, the special characteristics of 
high-technology markets and a concern about innovation could argue for increased antitrust 
vigilance, on the theory that the potential for high rates of technological change and network 
effects magnify the harm from conduct that slows down such change or distorts the competition 
to become the dominant standard. 
The agencies have not formally articulated their view on how, if at all, a concern about 
innovation alters their approach to antitrust enforcement.  They have, however, considered the 
analogous question of how to take into account the differences between intellectual property 
and other forms of property.   Despite substantial differences between these forms of property,
8 
they have declared their confidence that for the purpose of antitrust analysis, intellectual 
property is essentially comparable to any other form of property.
9  One might expect the 
agencies to take a similar approach to whether antitrust should be different in high-technology 
markets:  to treat competitive markets as generally conducive to innovation and to deal with 
factors such as technological change, high fixed costs, knowledge spillovers, and network 
effects on a case-by-case basis, rather than through the broad generalizations either of the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis or of the arguments for stricter scrutiny.  As we show below, this is 
indeed how the agencies have approached actual antitrust enforcement actions since 1995.  The 
authors also agree with this general approach.  There is little evidence that more concentrated 
markets are necessarily beneficial for research and development (although certain combinations, 
such as research joint ventures, have produced positive results).  Furthermore, there is at least 
anecdotal evidence that innovation can thrive in competitive market structures.
10 
                                                 
7 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (1942). 
8 Among other things: (1) intellectual property is easier to misappropriate than other forms of property; (2) a patent 
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10 See, e.g., MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).  
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III.  INNOVATION CONCERNS IN DOJ AND FTC MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
SINCE THE IP GUIDELINES:  OFTEN CITED, RARELY DECISIVE 
A.   The Rise of Innovation Concerns in The 1990s 
The publication of the IP Guidelines in April 1995 coincided with heightened concerns 
expressed by the antitrust agencies about the adverse effects of mergers and acquisitions on 
innovation.  From the start of Fiscal Year 1995 through the end of Fiscal Year 1999,
11 the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission challenged a total of 269 mergers and 
acquisitions (excluding bank transactions).  Most of these challenges were settled with consent 
decrees.  The agencies cited concerns about the transaction￿s likely impact on innovation as a 
reason for the challenge in 47 of these 269 cases, or in 17.5 percent of all challenges over this 
time period.  Table 1 shows the breakdown for mergers and acquisitions challenged by the DOJ 
and the FTC.  The DOJ challenged 121 mergers in the time period from FY 1995 through FY 
1999 and mentioned innovation as a reason for the challenge in eleven of them (9.1 percent).  
The FTC challenged 148 mergers during this period and mentioned innovation as a reason for 
the challenge in 36  of the cases (24 percent of the merger challenges).
12 
Table 1 
Challenges to Mergers and Acquisitions: FY 1995 ￿ FY 1999 
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For comparison, Table 2 shows the number of DOJ and FTC challenges to mergers and 
acquisitions in the time period from the start of FY 1990 through the end of FY 1994.  The 
agencies challenged a total of 135 mergers and acquisitions over this period (excluding bank 
transactions).  This is about one-half of the number challenged from FY 1995 through FY  1999 
and is generally consistent with the increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions that 
occurred in the latter half of the 1990s.  More importantly for our purposes, the agencies noted 
that innovation was a factor in the challenges in only four cases, two by the DOJ and two by the 
FTC.  The agencies identified innovation as a reason to challenge a merger or acquisition in 
only three percent of the challenges over this period.  This is far below the 17.5 percent of the 
cases that included innovation as a reason for the challenge in the second half of the 1990s. 
Table 2 
Challenges to Mergers and Acquisitions:  FY 1990 ￿ FY 1994 




























B.   Has Innovation Been Central to Merger Enforcement by the Agencies? 
The statistics in Tables 1 and 2 show that innovation has loomed large in the latter half 
of the 1990s as a stated reason for the agencies￿ merger enforcement policies.  Yet these data 
are not sufficient to show that innovation concerns have been pivotal in the agencies￿ 
enforcement decisions.  Whether innovation has emerged as a foundation for merger policy is 
not an easy question to answer because we are not privy to the agencies￿ hierarchy of 
competitive concerns, other than what they express in their public announcements.  We can, 
however, ask a different question:  based on the information in the public record, is there reason 
to believe that antitrust enforcement actions would have been different if the agencies did not 
pursue innovation as a policy concern?    
8 
With respect to innovation, mergers challenged by the FTC and by the DOJ can be 
divided into three categories. 
•  Mergers that would reduce competition in an existing goods market. 
•  Mergers that would reduce potential competition in an existing goods market. 
•  Mergers that would reduce competition only in an innovation or technology 
market or in a goods market that does not yet exist but is predicted to exist in the 
future. 
All antitrust impacts ultimately follow from effects on price, quality, and availability of 
goods and services.  Nonetheless, innovation market analysis can be a useful tool where a 
merger or practice affects goods and services that do not yet exist, or affects the quality-
adjusted price of goods and services in markets where firms are not actual or potential 
competitors.
13  Thus, innovation market concerns have a direct impact on the antitrust 
enforcement approach and outcome for mergers that fall in the last of the three categories 
described above.  Goods markets are sufficient to analyze transactions that primarily affect 
competition in markets for existing goods and services.  Innovation analysis may inform 
concerns about mergers that fall in this first category,
14 but it is not necessary to reach an 
enforcement decision.   An innovation market approach could be useful as an analytical tool for 
mergers that fall in the second category,
15 but in principle these transactions can be analyzed by 
applying potential competition doctrine.
16   
A closer look at the mergers challenged by the agencies in which there was a claim that 
the merger would harm innovation shows that, in a large majority of cases, the merger￿s impact 
on prices in markets for existing goods and services likely would have been sufficient to 
challenge the transaction.  Take, for example, the  FTC press release announcing settlement of 
                                                 
13 An example of the latter impact is United States v.General Motors, Civ. No. 93-530 (D.D.C. 1993) (innovation 
effects in markets where the parties are not actual or potential competitors). 
14 According to the IP Guidelines, ￿[i]f a licensing arrangement may adversely affect competition to develop new 
or improved goods or processes, the Agencies will analyze such an impact either as a separate competitive effect in 
relevant goods or technology markets, or as a competitive effect in a separate innovation market.￿  IP Guidelines 
§3.2.3.  In the former case, although innovation concerns may have been significant, pre-Guidelines analysis would 
often have condemned the merger in any event, based on the usual concentration, competitive effect, entry, and 
efficiency analysis in the relevant goods markets.   
15 See Richard J. Gilbert &  Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: 
The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.  569 (1995).  
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the challenge to the acquisition of Cordis Corporation by Johnson and Johnson.
17  In addition to 
innovation concerns, the FTC noted that the acquisition, if it proceeded without the required 
divestiture, would give just two firms control of 85 percent of the market for neurological 
shunts used in the treatment of hydrocephalus, and that entry by a new firm in a timely manner 
would be unlikely because of difficulties in developing competitive neurological shunt designs, 
establishing manufacturing facilities, organizing a sales and service network and obtaining 
Food and Drug Administration approval.
18  These are likely sufficient grounds to challenge the 
merger without regard to its effects on innovation (assuming that competitive effects in the 
market for neurological shunts reflect the high market shares and there are no substantial 
offsetting efficiencies).   
Publicly available information suggests that most of the forty-seven merger challenges 
from FY 1995 through FY 1999 in which innovation was mentioned as a competitive effect 
would have been challenged, and the same relief obtained, based solely on their likely price 
effects in markets for existing goods and services.  In these cases, the mergers combined actual 
competitors in highly concentrated markets with high barriers to entry.  In our evaluation, 
another five of these forty seven cases could have been challenged based on a theory of 
potential competition following enforcement principles described in the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines (still in effect for non-horizontal mergers).
19  In each of these five cases, one of the 
merging parties was an established producer in a concentrated market and the other party was 
identified as a likely potential entrant.
20  Of the forty-seven cases in which innovation was 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 See Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (1995) and Richard 
T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19 
(1995).  
17 December 20, 1995, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9512/jj.htm. 
18 Id. 
19 U.S. Dep￿t of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 13,103. 
20 These cases are (i) Boston Scientific Corporation, 119 F.T.C. 549 (1995); (ii) Hoechst AG, 120 F.T.C. 1010 
(1995); (iii) ABB/Elsag Bailey Process Automation N.V., Dkt. No. C-3867  (complaint and settlement issued 
January 11, 1999) (complaint available at  http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9901/9910040cmp.htm); (iv) Zeneca Group 
plc/Astra AB, FTC File No. 991 0089 (complaint and settlement issued  Mar. 25, 1999) (complaint available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/zenecacmp.htm); (v) Hoechst AG/Rhone-Poulenc, C-3919 (complaint and 
settlement issued  Dec. 7, 1999)  (complaint available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9912/hoechstcmp.htm).    
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mentioned as a competitive effect, we have identified about  eight cases for which innovation 
effects probably
21 were central and necessary to the enforcement decision, in whole or in part.
22   
These eight cases represent only three percent of the mergers challenged by the agencies 
in the period from FY 1995 through FY 1999.  We do not mean to imply that innovation 
concerns were unimportant to the enforcement decisions in the other cases.  But, in our opinion, 
these cases could have been successfully litigated based on price effects in markets for existing 
goods and services or based on a theory of potential competition in markets for existing goods 
and services.  Furthermore, we have seen no public indication that the agencies have relied on 
innovation effects to allow a merger that would otherwise be blocked because of its impacts on 
existing goods and services.  The bottom line for merger enforcement policy at the agencies is 
that, in most cases, innovation has not changed the enforcement decision, either as a reason to 
block a merger or as a reason to allow an otherwise troublesome transaction to occur.  We 
describe the handful of cases in which innovation was central to the enforcement decision in 
more detail below. 
 
C.   Innovation effects where firms do not compete in goods markets 
Sensormatic and Knogo were competitors in the manufacture of electronic article 
surveillance (EAS) systems and components.  Sensormatic proposed to acquire all of  Knogo 
assets outside of North America, plus intellectual property assets in North America for 
manufacturer-installed disposable anti-shoplifting labels, a next-generation product that did not 
yet exist but as to which both Sensormatic and Knogo had active R&D programs.  It is difficult 
to tell from the public record materials,
23 but we infer from them that Knogo did not use its non-
North American assets to produce and sell current-generation products into the United States.  
Therefore, the proposed acquisition did not eliminate any competition within U.S. jurisdiction 
                                                 
21 In some cases, it is difficult to make a confident judgment because the publicly available information is so 
sparse.  In Monsanto/DeKalb, for example, we have only a press release on which to base a judgment because the 
Justice Department generally does not seek a consent decree when the relief it would seek has been fully 
implemented prior to the time a challenge would occur.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice 
Department Approves Monsanto￿s Acquisition of DeKalb Genetics Corporation (Nov. 30, 1998), (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/2103.htm.) 
22 We say ￿in part,￿ because in at least three of these cases, it appears that the merger would have elicited a 
challenge based on traditional goods market analysis with respect to at least some products, but the innovation 
analysis resulted in relief in markets that may otherwise have gone unchallenged. 
23 See Sensormatic Electronics Corp., 119 F.T.C. 520 (1995); see also Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 5428 (Jan. 27, 1995).  
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in current generation EAS products. The FTC challenged the acquisition in two relevant 
markets:  ￿the research and development of disposable labels developed and used for source 
labelling,￿ and ￿the research and development of processes to manufacture disposable labels.￿
24 
In those markets, the FTC alleged that the acquisition would adversely affect both Knogo￿s 
incentives to conduct R&D and the number of research tracks that would be devoted to 
developing the next generation product.
25 
  Thus, for geographic reasons, goods market competition was absent, but the merger 
nonetheless had great significance for R&D competition, which would affect the quality-
adjusted price of products sold in the future by Sensormatic in the United States.  In these 
respects, the case strongly resembles GM-Allison / ZF Friedrichshafen,
26 a case brought by the 
Justice Department early in the development of the IP Guidelines. 
 
D.   Pharmaceutical Cases with Two Pipeline Products 
  The FTC has had a number of pharmaceutical cases in which no drug of a particular 
therapeutic type yet exists, but the merging parties were well ahead of any other firms in 
developing such a drug, getting FDA approval, and commercializing it.  These cases would not 
be susceptible to the traditional potential competition doctrine because, as articulated by the 
1984 Merger Guidelines, the doctrine only applies to ￿the non-horizontal merger of a firm 
already in a market with a potential entrant to that market.￿
27  The innovation market concept 
has clearly been useful to the agencies in dealing with such situations, although it must be noted 
that, despite the potential difficulties, the FTC brought such a case in 1990 as a potential 
competition case.
28 
In Glaxo/Wellcome, the FTC alleged that, without modification, Glaxo plc￿s planned 
$14.3 billion acquisition of Wellcome plc would have substantially lessened competition in the 
U.S. market for the research and development of a class of drugs in oral form used to combat 
                                                 
24 Sensormatic, 119 F.T.C. at 522. 
25 Id. at 523.  
26 United States v. General Motors, Civil Action  No. 93-530 (D.D.C. 1993).  See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 
15, at 587 for a discussion of the enforcement issues in this case. 
27 § 4.11 (emphasis added). 
28 Roche Holding Ltd., 113 F.T.C. 1086 (1990) (market in which firms were far along in R&D, but no existing 
product).  The case has been described as a ￿double potential competition￿ case.  M. Howard Morse, The Limits of 
Innovation Markets, ANTITRUST & INTELL. PROP.  (ABA. Intell. Prop. Comm. Newsl., Chicago, IL), Spring 2001, 
at 22, 23.  
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migraine attacks, known as 5HT1D agonists.
29  At the time the merger was proposed, migraine 
drugs were available only in injectable form, and the FTC did not consider them sufficiently 
close substitutes for oral drugs to be included in the relevant product market.
30  Glaxo and 
Wellcome were the two firms that were farthest along in developing an oral drug for migraine 
attacks, and the acquisition would have eliminated research and development competition 
between them
31   According to William Baer, Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition, 
Glaxo would have an incentive to reduce R&D effort because the merged firm would not face 
competition to introduce an oral drug until some third firm could complete the FDA approval 
process many years hence.
32 
  The FTC permitted the merger to go forward under the condition that Wellcome divest 
its worldwide research and development assets for non-injectable drugs.  Baer noted that the 
divestiture succeeded in maintaining vigorous competition in the development of oral drugs for 
migraines and allowed Zeneca to receive FDA approval for an oral migraine drug in only 15 
months.  He attributed this to the obligations imposed on Glaxo to provide information, 
technical assistance, and advice to the acquirer about the R&D efforts, and the requirements to 
provide consultation with and training by Glaxo employees knowledgeable about the project.
33 
  The FTC took a similar approach in Upjohn/Pharmacia
34 and in some of the markets in 
Baxter/Immuno
35 and American Home Products/American Cyanamid.
36  In Upjohn/Pharmacia, 
the relevant market was defined as ￿the research, development, manufacture and sale of 
topoisomerase I Inhibitors for the treatment of colorectal cancer.￿
37  The FTC noted that ￿no 
topoisomerase I Inhibitor has yet been approved for sale in the United States,￿ but that ￿Upjohn 
and Pharmacia are two of only a very small number of firms currently in the advanced stages of 
                                                 
29 Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815, 816-17 (1995). 
30 William J. Baer, Antitrust Enforcement and High-technology Markets, Address  before the ABA Sections of 
Business Law, Litigation, and Tort and Insurance Practice, (Nov. 12, 1998) (available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ipat6.htm)   [hereinafter Baer, Antitrust Enforcement]. 
31 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Glaxo to Settle FTC Charges  Will Divest Wellcome Assets to 
Consummate Merger (March 16, 1995) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F95/glaxo-wellcome.htm). 
32 Baer, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 30.  
33 Id. 
34 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996). 
35 123 F.T.C. 905 (1997). 
36 119 F.T.C. 217 (1995). 
37 121 F.T.C. 44, 45.  
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developing topoisomerase I inhibitors for the treatment of colorectal cancer in the United 
States.￿
38 
 In  Baxter/Immuno there were two types of products, Factor VIII Inhibitor treatments and 
Fibrin Sealant.  The former was an existing goods market, and Baxter and Immuno were the 
only two suppliers in the United States.  No one had yet received FDA approval for Fibrin 
Sealant, however.  Baxter and Immuno were two of only a small number of companies seeking 
FDA approval for such a product.  Thus, an innovation market approach was essential for 
dealing with the problem in one market, but largely irrelevant to the other. 
  AHP/American Cyanamid was of the same pattern.  In three markets, AHP and 
American Cyanamid were actual competitors in a goods market.  In one market (cytokines for 
white blood cell and platelet restoration), Cyanamid was an existing seller and AHP was a 
potential competitor.  And in yet another market (rotavirus vaccine), neither company had a 
product, but they were strong R&D competitors.
39 
E.   Innovation Competition and Aggregation of Patent Portfolios 
The FTC alleged that the proposed merger of Ciba-Geigy Ltd and Sandoz Ltd. would 
adversely affect competition for the development and commercialization of gene therapy 
treatments.
40   Gene therapy is a new means of treating diseases or medical conditions by 
modifying genes in patients￿ cells. Ciba-Geigy (through its 46.5 percent stock ownership 
interest in Chiron), and Sandoz had several gene therapy products in development at the time of 
the proposed merger, although no products were yet approved by the FDA.   In addition, both 
parties had fundamental patents and other specialized assets important in researching, 
developing, and commercializing whatever gene therapy products might be discovered. 
  The FTC￿s complaint alleged that the merger would: 
(a) combine alternative technologies and reduce innovation competition among 
researchers and developers of gene therapy products, including reduction in, delay of 
or redirection of research and development tracks;  
(b) increase the merged firm’s ability to exercise market power, either unilaterally or 
through coordinated interaction with Chiron, in the gene therapy markets;  
                                                 
38 Id. at 46. 
39 119 F.T.C. 217, 219-20.  
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(c) heighten barriers to entry by combining portfolios of patents and patent applications 
of uncertain breadth and validity, requiring potential entrants to invent around or 
declare invalid a greater array of patents; and 
(d) create a disincentive in the merged firm to license intellectual property rights to or 
collaborate with other companies as compared to premerger incentives. 
We discuss these four effects in a somewhat different order, starting with those most 
susceptible to traditional analysis. 
Effect (b) addresses price effects in goods markets, with the important twist that the 
markets do not yet exist in commercial form and may never exist if clinical trials go badly.  As 
noted above, this kind of effect can be characterized as potential competition if one is willing to 
treat the doctrine as including competition in the future between products that do not yet exist.
41  
Effect (a) addresses the same markets at issue as in effect (b), which one could 
characterize as goods markets that do not presently exist, but may exist in the future.   Rather 
than addressing price effects in these markets, this element of the complaint  addresses 
innovation effects.  That is, it asks whether innovation itself will be reduced.  Of course, the 
same question can be asked of a market in which there are already existing products, which is 
why the IP Guidelines note that in many cases, rather than define an innovation market, the 
agencies will evaluate innovation effects in a goods market.
42 
Effect (d) deals with horizontal competitive effects in an existing technology market.  
According to the FTC, the merger would combine existing intellectual property rights held 
separately by Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz.  These rights were alleged to be substitutes for each 
other but essential complements to the R&D efforts of other firms attempting to develop gene 
therapy products.
43  By combining their substitute technology rights, the merger would make it 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. 842, 843-45 (1997). 
41 See supra note 28. 
42 IP Guidelines § 3.2.3. 
43 See Analysis to Aid Public Comment, In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy, at 6 (premerger, Ciba and Chiron ￿had the 
incentive and did act as rival centers from which others could obtain needed intellectual property rights￿), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1996/9612/ciba.pdf; Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law:  From 
Adversaries To Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1  (Winter 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/aipla.htm (￿What the competitors lacked were the patent rights to 
complementary technologies that they previously were able to obtain either through Ciba or Sandoz, but which, 
absent the Commission’s order, would have been monopolized post-merger.￿); Willard K. Tom, Licensing and  
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easier for the merged company to foreclose competition by unilaterally refusing to license 
potential competitors or to extract rents from gene therapy products by raising the price of their 
essential technology.
44 
Effect (c) deals with vertical effects in a technology market.  According to the FTC, the 
combination of the parties￿ patent portfolios could have adverse consequences for competition 
even if the patents are complements rather than substitutes (meaning that having licenses from 
both companies would be helpful to engage in gene therapy research and development).  
Without the merger, each firm could compete by licensing, inventing around, or proving 
invalid, the other firm￿s patents, and a third-party firm could compete by licensing from one 
firm and inventing around or invalidating the patents of the other.  With the merger, a rival firm 
would have to license, invent around, or prove invalid, both firms￿ patents, which could be a 
much more formidable task.  This is a variant of the two-level entry problem discussed in § 4.21 
of the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
45   
With respect to each of these alleged effects, the FTC identified ways in which Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz would offer competition to each other in the absence of a merger or license. 
The FTC￿s evaluation of the competition issues raised by combining the Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz patent portfolios is consistent with a fundamental principle in the Intellectual Property 
Guidelines, namely, that a transaction may raise antitrust concerns if it eliminates competition 
that would have occurred in its absence.
46  The FTC alleged that the proposed merger would 
                                                                                                                                                             
Antitrust:  Common Goals and Uncommon Problems, Address before the Before the American Conference 
Institute  9th National Conference on Licensing Intellectual Property (Oct.12, 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/aciippub.htm (￿As long as they can play one off against the other, the potential 
rewards are so great that it pays the firms to continue their research. Post-merger, however, the combined entity 
becomes a single bottleneck. Since the research firms can no longer play one off against the other, the terms on 
which they can partner with the combined entity change markedly for the worse.￿). 
44 Another case during the relevant period, Monsanto/DeKalb, appears to address similar concerns.  While we have 
only a press release to go on, because the parties implemented the remedy immediately and obviated the need for a 
consent decree, that release indicates that the Justice Department was concerned about two types of competing 
intellectual property:  (1) patents on competing methods of corn transformation, and (2) patents on competing 
types of corn germplasm.  In each case, the concern was that ￿[b]iotechnology developers wanting to introduce 
improvements in corn require[d] access￿ to such patents.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice Justice 
Department Approves Monsanto’s Acquisition of Dekalb Genetics Corporation, (Nov. 30, 1998), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/2103.htm. 
45 Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified 
Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 218-19 (1997).   
46 IP Guidelines §3.1 (￿[A]ntitrust concerns may arise when a licensing arrangement harms competition among 
entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license 
(entities in a ￿horizontal relationship￿) (footnote omitted).  
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have eliminated such competition.  However, to the extent that Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz each 
owned intellectual property that might block attempts by the other party to compete in the 
manufacture or sale of gene therapy products, combining blocking intellectual property rights 
might have procompetitive benefits, such as eliminating double-marginalization and making 
licensing easier by combining essential patents.
47  The agencies would do a public service by 
elaborating on the circumstances in which the competitive concerns from eliminating potential 
competition are likely to be more compelling than the efficiency benefits from integrating 
blocking or complementary intellectual property rights.  
The FTC resolved its concerns about competition in research and development of gene 
therapies by imposing a number of licensing conditions on the merged company.  These 
included a requirement to grant non-exclusive licenses to one firm for patents on certain gene 
therapy technologies, a requirement to license several basic patents to all comers non-
exclusively at low royalties, and an order that would bar Ciba, Chiron, and Sandoz from 
acquiring exclusive licenses for technology related to the use of specified genes for 
chemoresistance gene therapy products.
48  
 
F.   Innovation Effects in Price-Regulated Markets 
 
  The DOJ filed suit on March 23, 1998, to prevent the proposed acquisition of Northrop 
Grumman by Lockheed Martin.
49  Northrop and Lockheed compete to develop, manufacture, 
and sell a range of electronics systems and military aircraft to the U.S. military.  These include 
airborne early warning radar, directed infrared and on-board radio frequency countermeasures 
systems, the SQQ-89 antisubmarine warfare combat system, electro-optical missile warning 
systems, remote mine hunting systems, stealth technology, fiber-optic towed decoys, and high 
performance fixed-wing military aircraft.  In addition, Lockheed and Northrop are also prime 
and sub-contractors for several military systems.  The DOJ contended that the merger would 
make it easier for the merged company to favor its own capabilities for subsystems at the 
                                                 
47 Willard K. Tom, The 1975 Xerox Consent Decree: Ancient Artifacts and Current Tensions, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 
967, 987-88 (2001). 
48 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Accord in Ciba Geigy/Sandoz Merger to Prevent 
 Slowdown in Gene Therapy Development & Preserve Competition in Corn Herbicides, Flea-Control Markets 
(December 17, 1996) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9612/ciba.htm. 
49 United States v. Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1998) (Complaint), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1600/1609.htm.  
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expense of rival suppliers and to collect competitively sensitive information about its rivals, 
causing harm to competition in markets for these subsystems.
50 
Many of the markets in which Lockheed and Northrop compete are highly concentrated 
and have very high barriers to entry.  Thus, the challenge to the merger could have been based 
solely on a traditional analysis of competition in existing goods markets.  However, according 
to Rubinfeld and Hoven, ￿the cornerstone of the challenge was concern that the acquisition 
would substantially lessen innovation in various products and services for defense 
applications.￿
51  The DOJ did not specifically allege harm to competition in a market for 
innovation in the Lockheed-Northrop case.  However, as a line of commerce, the complaint 
identified the development as well as production and sale of the products at issue.
52   
The preservation of R&D paths was an important factor in the DOJ￿s decision to 
challenge the proposed merger of Lockheed and Northrop.  Successful innovation is equal parts 
inspiration and perspiration, and a dose of good luck.  Sometimes a firm succeeds in 
introducing new products and services because its business focus requires specialized R&D 
assets that prove particularly valuable for new applications.  Other times, a firm succeeds 
because it has the courage and foresight to strike off in new directions.  DeSanti and Yao note 
the importance of diversity in R&D paths for successful industrial innovation.
53  According to 
this theory, it is not necessary that firms￿ research and development programs compete directly 
with each other.  Instead, the value for innovation stems from preserving multiple R&D paths, 
any one of which may be successful. 
                                                 
50 The Department of Defense also opposed the merger.  Complaint ¶ 7 (quoting Letter from William S. Cohen, 
Secretary of Defense to Janet Reno, United States Attorney General (Mar. 23, 1998)). 
51 Daniel L. Rubinfeld & John Hoven, Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement (Jan. 19, 1999) (unpublished 
manuscript to be published in edited volume  by Cambridge University Press) (on file with the authors) (emphasis 
added). Rubinfeld was Chief Economist and Hoven was staff economist at the DOJ during the investigation of the 
proposed Lockheed-Northrop merger. 
52 Lockheed/Northrop had pronounced effects on the structure of existing goods markets and therefore may not 
belong on the list of mergers for which innovation concerns were central to the enforcement decision.  We err on 
the side of over-inclusion because technology plays a particularly important role in weapons systems and 
Department of Defense procurement policies may constrain the price effects from mergers.  If Lockheed/Northrop 
does belong on the list of innovation cases, so may other defense-related mergers in the relevant time period.  
These include Lockheed/Loral, Lehman Brothers/L-3 Communications, and Raytheon/Hughes.  See Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, 122 F.T.C. 161 (1996); United States v. Lehman Brothers, Civil Action No.: 1:98CV00796 
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 1998); (Complaint) United States v. Raytheon, Civ.  No.: 1:97CV02397,  (D.D.C. filed Oct. 
16, 1997) (Complaint).  (available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7100/7132.htm).   However, the agencies 
alleged substantial price effects in all of these mergers, as well as in Lockheed/Northrop.   
53 Susan S. DeSanti & Dennis A. Yao, Innovation Issues Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 
505 (1993).  
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  Focusing on the market for high-performance fixed-wing aircraft, Rubinfeld and Hoven  
note that  
￿the issue was not whether a consolidation from three airframe 
manufacturers to two would reduce the intensity of innovative effort.  The 
published literature does not yield a clear conclusion on that, especially 
since a large share of R&D spending is funded by the Department of 
Defense.  Rather, the issue was that the number of independent innovators 
will be reduced by one . . . .￿
54  
The DOJ Director of Operations and Merger Enforcement echoed the importance of innovation 
in the DOJ￿s decision to challenge the Lockheed/Northrop merger and emphasized the need to 
maintain diversity in the core capabilities to develop and produce advanced military systems.
55  
  The Lockheed-Northrop case features prominently in the DOJ￿s evolving approach to 
the analysis of innovation issues.  The case demonstrates that the DOJ will act to preserve the 
diversity of R&D efforts even if there is no clear evidence that these efforts are competitive 
substitutes in the design and development of new goods and services. 
 
IV.  DOJ AND FTC NON-MERGER CASES THAT INVOLVE INNOVATION 
  The antitrust agencies have identified innovation concerns as significant factors in 
several recent non-merger investigations.  We discuss some of the more important examples in 
this section.  
                                                 
54 Rubinfeld & Hoven, supra note 51, at 31. 
55 Constance K. Robinson, Leap-Frog And Other Forms Of Innovation: Protecting the Future for High-Tech and 
Emerging Industries Through Merger Enforcement, Address before the American Bar Association (June 10, 1999), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2482.htm.  
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A.   United States v. Microsoft
56 
For many, the Microsoft case is the banner advertisement for the new focus of antitrust 
enforcement on innovation.  The DOJ and seventeen states alleged that Microsoft monopolized 
the market for PC operating systems and the market for Internet browsers.
57  The alleged 
anticompetitive conduct included: 
•  tying the browser to the operating system, both by conditioning the license for the 
Windows operating system on the obligation to license Microsoft￿s Internet Explorer 
browser and by selling a bundled product consisting of the operating system and the 
browser; 
•  various licensing practices that made it more difficult for Microsoft￿s rivals to distribute 
competing browsers; 
•  a pattern of predatory conduct that included requiring computer manufacturers to install 
Microsoft￿s browser and undermining the Java language standard to discourage its 
widespread adoption. 
The IP Guidelines note that ￿The agencies would be likely to challenge a tying 
arrangement if:  (1) the seller has market power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market for the tied product, and (3) efficiency 
justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects.￿
58  In  Microsoft , 
the DOJ alleged, among other things, anticompetitive impacts in the market for the tying 
product.  The government alleged that Microsoft tied the operating system and the browser to 
quash the entry threat posed by the popularity of Netscape and the platform-independent Java 
programming language.  A lesson from the Microsoft case is that future guidelines should 
address a broader set of possible adverse competitive impacts from tying. 
The allegation that Microsoft engaged in various licensing practices that impeded 
Microsoft￿s rivals￿ ability to distribute competing browsers is consistent with the IP Guidelines￿ 
discussion of exclusive dealing arrangements.  According to the IP Guidelines:  
                                                 
56 One of the authors (Gilbert) consulted for the Department of Justice in the Microsoft case. 
57 United States v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998) (Complaint)  (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm).   See RICHARD J. GILBERT and MICHAEL L. KATZ , AN 
ECONOMIST’S GUIDE TO UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT, Univ. of California, Working Paper (2000) for a more 
detailed discussion of the  economic consequences of the alleged anticompetitive conduct in the Microsoft case. 
58 IP Guidelines  § 5.3 (footnotes omitted).  
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exclusive dealing occurs when a license prevents the licensee from licensing, 
selling, distributing, or using competing technologies. . . . In determining 
whether an exclusive dealing arrangement is likely to reduce competition in a 
relevant market, the agencies will take into account the extent to which the 
arrangement (1) promotes the exploitation and development of the licensor’s 
technology and (2) anticompetitively forecloses the exploitation and 
development of, or otherwise constrains competition among, competing 
technologies.
59   
The government claimed that Microsoft￿s licensing practices constrained competition among 
competing technologies, even if it did not entirely foreclose Netscape, and that Microsoft 
offered few, if any, efficiency justifications.   
The IP Guidelines are conceptually consistent with the allegations of exclusive and 
preferential dealing arrangements in the Microsoft case.  However, it should be noted  that 
conduct which increases a rival￿s costs can have anticompetitive effects even if the conduct 
does not completely foreclose distribution channels.  As discussed below, this is particularly 
likely in the presence of network effects.   
Much of the Microsoft case centered on the predatory nature of Microsoft￿s practices, 
including Microsoft￿s bundling strategy (which obligated computer manufacturers to license 
and install Microsoft￿s browser)
60 and interference with the Java language standard.  As is 
typically the case with predatory conduct, consumers may benefit in the short run, but the 
practice can have adverse impacts in the long term that more than offset the near-term benefits.  
The key allegation in the Microsoft case was that Microsoft￿s conduct threatened to eliminate 
the combination of Netscape and the Java language that could enable other platforms to emerge 
as viable competitors to the Windows operating system.  This is a concern about innovation 
and, in particular, innovation in markets with strong network effects.  The IP Guidelines address 
concerns about innovation impacts, although not with enough specificity to conclude that 
disadvantaging a competitor such as Netscape would harm competition.  Such an inquiry is 
                                                 
59 IP Guidelines at § 5.4. 
60 In markets for intellectual property, where the marginal cost is close to zero, there is some ambiguity about 
whether giving a product away for free constitutes pricing below cost.  Consequently, the DOJ focused on other 
aspects of Microsoft￿s bundling strategy, including prohibiting computer manufacturers from uninstalling  
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necessarily fact specific, and it is unlikely that guidance for antitrust policy could productively 
be crafted in sufficient detail to predict policy conclusions in complex cases such as the 
Microsoft case.  What can be done is to include more discussion of competitive impacts in 
markets with strong network effects.  
Network effects raise the possibility that conduct can ￿tip￿ consumer choices to produce 
outcomes that have persistent adverse effects.  In network markets, successful predation does 
not require the destruction of a competitor.  It can be sufficient to damage the competitor 
enough so that network forces lead to the emergence of a different market leader.  Even in 
markets that have a ￿winner take all￿ property, maintaining a level competitive playing field is 
important for ensuring that the best firm is the winner.  At the same time, one must recognize 
that achieving network effects, like other economies of scale, confer a consumer benefit.  The 
Justice Department seemed to take this fact into account in seeking a remedy that did not 
attempt to create additional operating system companies. 
In addition to these network issues, the Java allegation in the Microsoft case (and other 
enforcement actions, such as the Dell case at the FTC
61) focused attention on the importance of 
conduct that interferes with the establishment of industry standards.  Such conduct can be an 
anticompetitive abuse of market power and warrants attention in any future guidelines in the 
area of innovation and intellectual property. 
Much of the conduct challenged in the Microsoft case could be held unlawful without 
regard to effects on innovation.  The tying allegation, the contracts that allegedly excluded 
competition from rival browsers, and the allegation of monopoly maintenance through 
predatory conduct are all examples of conduct that could be evaluated from the perspective of 
price impacts in existing markets for goods and services (in this case, operating systems 
software and browsers).  Such a perspective would be highly incomplete, however.  First, a 
traditional static view might fail to give proper credit to Microsoft￿s defense that its setting of a 
zero price for Internet Explorer could allow consumers to benefit from the competition to 
secure a natural monopoly.   In a market without innovation and network effects, pricing below 
cost might have no purpose other than to secure a monopoly through predatory means, so as to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Microsoft￿s browser and engaging in other conduct that increased the cost to consumers of obtaining the Netscape 
browser. 
61 Dell Computer Co., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996), discussed at note  68 infra and accompanying text.  
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raise prices later.  In a market inwhich network effects are strong enough to result in natural 
monopoly, offering low prices and better products in order to secure the monopoly position may 
confer consumer benefits.   Second, a static view might fail to recognize the considerable harm 
that Microsoft￿s other alleged conduct ￿ principally tying and exclusive dealing ￿ could do by 
allowing Microsoft to win the standards race without competing solely on the merits of its 
products.
 62  Failure to account for innovation effects, therefore, could result in either 
underenforcement or overenforcement in a market with strong network effects.   
 
B.   United States v. Visa and MasterCard
63 
On October 7, 1998, the DOJ filed suit against Visa and MasterCard, the two largest 
general purpose credit card networks in theUnited States.
64  The lawsuit alleged that Visa and 
MasterCard violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by restraining competition in the market for 
general purpose card network products and services.   
Visa and MasterCard are joint ventures (called ￿associations￿) of member banks.  Most 
of the large banks are members of both joint ventures and are extensively involved in the 
governance of both organizations.  Several large banks simultaneously serve on the board of 
directors of one association and on important committees of the other.  The DOJ￿s complaint 
alleged that this dual governance structure diminished incentives for innovation by both 
organizations.  Specifically, the complaint alleged that the overlap of competitive interests in 
both organizations and the sharing of competitively sensitive information have caused each 
defendant to reduce or delay its investments in new general purpose card technologies, 
products, and services.  These include Internet technology, smart cards, and commercial cards. 
The complaint alleged other anticompetitive conduct and effects, such as refraining 
from competitive advertising about the relative values of the Visa and MasterCard brands.  
Additionally, the complaint alleged that the defendants and their governing banks have harmed 
                                                 
62 Recognizing that the issue was one of ensuring that consumers reaped the benefits of competition for the 
monopoly, rather than one of avoiding monopoly altogether, the Department explicitly conceded that charging a 
zero price for Internet Explorer was not anticompetitive in and of itself.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellees United 
States and the State Plaintiffs at 63-64, United States v. Microsoft, Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan 12, 
2001) (￿Had Microsoft stopped there, it would not have violated the antitrust laws.￿). 
63 Mr. Tom’s law firm represented Visa International in this litigation, although Mr. Tom was not personally 
involved.  Because the matter remains in litigation as of this writing, Mr. Tom played no role in the drafting of this 
section. 
64 United States v. Visa USA, Inc., Civ. No. 98-civ.7076, (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998).   
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competition by adopting rules and policies that prohibit their member banks from issuing cards 
on the American Express or Discover general purpose card networks. 
For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of the Visa-MasterCard case is its 
allegation that the dual governance of these card networks has discouraged investment in new 
general purpose credit card technologies.  This element of the DOJ￿s complaint deals directly 
with alleged harm to innovation resulting from the structure of a joint venture.  The complaint 
does not allege that Visa and MasterCard have conspired to elevate prices for credit card 
services (which the complaint calls the ￿card-issuing￿ market).  Several thousand financial 
institutions issue Visa and MasterCard charge cards and compete on the terms at which credit 
card services are offered.   The complaint also does not allege that Visa and MasterCard have 
acted to impede competition for the services that enable merchants to accept general purpose 
credit cards (which the complaint calls the ￿card-acceptance￿ market).  Instead, the DOJ￿s 
concern is that competition at the level of the network systems (including new card features and 
services) has been diminished by the structure of the Visa and MasterCard joint ventures.
65   
The DOJ￿s case rests on the theory that the structure of the Visa and MasterCard joint 
ventures reduces incentives for each party to invest in new products, services, and promotional 
activities that would ￿steal￿ business from the other party.  The diminished incentives arise for 
two reasons.  First, because major banks share in the ownership and governance of both 
associations, the overlapping financial interests reduce the ability of the controlling banks to 
benefit from innovations that move market share from one association to the other.  The 
governing bodies would either discount the benefits of an innovation because it may harm the 
other association, or they may require an innovation to be shared by both associations, thereby 
reducing its value to the innovator.  Second, because owners share competitively sensitive 
information, each association has the ability to learn of and react to competitive initiatives by 
the other association, thereby reducing the benefits of these initiatives to the moving party. 
In general, whether firms have an incentive to invest in the economically efficient level 
of R&D depends on the extent to which they can appropriate the social benefits of their 
innovations.  Empirical evidence strongly suggests that innovators capture only a fraction of the 
                                                 
65 By impeding innovation at the system level, which provides inputs to the card-issuing and card-acceptance 
markets, the DOJ also alleged that the actions (and inactions) of the joint ventures raised quality-adjusted prices to 
consumers.  
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social value that their innovations create.
66  If this is also true for credit card associations, then 
the elimination of dual governance could promote economic efficiency by enhancing innovation 
incentives, and benefit consumers. 
 
C.  FTC V. DELL COMPUTER 
  Standard-setting is an important instrument of competition in the high-technology 
economy.  Standards play a key role in defining the gateways for competition.  An open 
standard can lower barriers to entry by making it easier for products to work with each other.  
At the same time, an open standard can raise barriers to entry for products that do not conform 
to the standard and can create market power for firms that control key technology that is 
necessary to implement the standard.
67   
  Standard-setting committees, such as the American National Standards Institute, often 
have internal rules to assure that the standard-setting process does not unduly create or enhance 
market power.  One of these rules is a requirement that participants in the standard-setting 
process inform others of any proprietary intellectual property rights owned by the participants 
that may be necessary to implement the standard.  If such rights exist, the owner must agree to 
license others at terms that are ￿fair and non-discriminatory.￿ 
  In 1992, the Video Electronics Standards Association established a standard for the VL-
bus, a mechanism to transfer instructions between a computer￿s microprocessor and its 
peripheral devices.  Dell Computer was a participant in the standard-setting process, but did not 
disclose that it owned intellectual property that was necessary to implement the standard.  After 
computer manufacturers sold more than 1.4 million personal computers incorporating the VL-
bus, Dell announced its intent to collect royalties.  The FTC intervened and accused Dell of 
engaging in unfair methods of competition by abusing the standard-setting process.
68  
According to the FTC, Dell￿s actions hindered industry acceptance of the VL-bus standard 
pending resolution of the patent issue, deterred companies from using the VL-bus, created 
uncertainties that increased the costs of using the VL-bus and chilled the willingness of 
                                                 
66 See Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J.  ECON.  29 (1992); Charles Jones & 
John Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q. J.  ECON. 1119 (1998). 
67 See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao , Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and High-Technology Industries, 
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (1995). 
68 Dell Computer Co., 121 F.T.C. 616, 617-18 (1996).   
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companies to participate in standard-setting efforts.  Dell settled the FTC￿s charges by agreeing 
not to enforce its patent against computer manufacturers incorporating the VL-bus design. 
  By requiring disclosure of intellectual property rights, the FTC avoided a possible 
￿hold-up￿ in which a firm exploits market power created by its ownership of intellectual 
property that is necessary to implement a standard.  David Balto of the FTC notes that the FTC 
consent order in the Dell case did not impose a general obligation for firms to disclose 
intellectual property rights in connection with standard-setting activities, but that since the 




D.  FTC V. INTEl
70 
On June 8, 1998, the FTC filed a complaint against the Intel Corporation accusing Intel 
of monopolizing the market for general purpose microprocessors.
71  The FTC￿s complaint 
charged that in separate incidents involving Digital Equipment Corporation, Intergraph 
Corporation, and Compaq Computer Corporation, Intel used its monopoly position to prevent 
those companies from enforcing their patent rights.  In particular, the complaint alleged that in 
response to patent infringement litigation and/or refusals to license patents to Intel on the terms 
it sought, Intel ceased to provide advance technical information and pre-release products needed 
by those companies to produce personal computers and workstations built with Intel 
microprocessors.
72   
In the FTC’s view, Intel￿s refusal to provide such information constituted the use of 
monopoly power in a tangible product in order to expropriate the intellectual property of  
others.
73  According to the FTC, the refusal tended to maintain Intel’s monopoly power in 
microprocessors, because technological access is critical in a high-technology network industry 
where a potential rival is trying to dislodge the entrenched firm by introducing a technology 
superior enough to overcome the network effects or is offering an incremental improvement to 
                                                 
69 David A. Balto, Standard Setting in a Network Economy, Address Before Cutting Edge Antitrust, Law Seminars 
International, (Feb. 17, 2000)  (available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.htm). 
70 Gilbert was an expert witness for Intel in this litigation and Tom was deputy director of the FTC’s Bureau of 
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the incumbent standard.
74  If a competitor such as Digital was unable to use the patent system to 
prevent Intel from copying those advantages, so the argument went, it would lose its incentive 
to innovate, and Intel would lose the incentive to compete against such innovations.  Moreover, 
another way to compete against Intel was to be sponsored by a powerful seller of 
complementary products.  If manufacturers of personal computers and workstations, such as 
Compaq and Intergraph, were unable to pursue patented innovations that could not be copied by 
other manufacturers of Intel-based products, they would not be in a position to sponsor 
competition in the market for microprocessors.  Thus, the FTC saw itself as the defender of 
patent rights, in keeping with the recognition in the IP Guidelines that intellectual property 
rights provided an important incentive for innovation. 
Intel expressed a very different view.  Intel disagreed with the FTC￿s conclusion that it 
possessed a monopoly in the market for general purpose microprocessors.  Intel argued that it 
could not exclude microprocessor competition, its market share was the result of successful 
innovation, other microprocessor competitors could take advantage of the large installed base of 
Intel-compatible computer software, and that other firms would rapidly displace Intel if it failed 
to continue to innovate.
75   In response to the argument that Intel￿s conduct adversely affected 
innovation, Intel argued that Intergraph and Compaq were not currently competitors in the 
design, manufacture, or sale of microprocessors,
76 and that Intel￿s conduct could have no 
significant impact on R&D competition because Intel had broad cross-licensing arrangements 
with nearly all of its microprocessor competitors.
77  These included Advanced Micro Devices, 
IBM, Motorola, Sun, and Hewlett-Packard.   
According to Intel, the number of R&D competitors was sufficient to earn the safe 
harbor treatment provided in the IP Guidelines.
78 Specifically, the Guidelines state:  
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the agencies will not challenge a 
restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement that may affect 
competition in an innovation market if (1) the restraint is not facially 
anticompetitive and (2) four or more independently controlled entities in 
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addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement possess the required 
specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in research 
and development that is a close substitute of the research and development 
activities of the parties to the licensing agreement.
79 
In the FTC’s view, however, this argument missed the point, for two reasons: (1) any 
innovation by a firm that had given a cross-license to Intel could be copied by Intel, and (2) a 
cross-license would not immunize such a firm from a cut-off of essential trade secrets or a 
threatened cut-off of physical product. 
In response to the FTC’s claim that Intel￿s conduct denied the manufacturers of IBM-
compatible computers, such as Digital and Compaq, the ability to benefit from innovations that 
differentiated their products, Intel argued that it had no cause to object to innovations that 
increased the values of computers that used its microprocessors, that it often supported such 
innovations, and that its conduct had no effect on such innovation in any case.
80  In the FTC’s 
view, however, Intel did indeed have an incentive to ensure that no single personal computer 
manufacturer had proprietary control over important features of such computers, because such 
control would enable the computer manufacturer to appropriate a larger share of the joint 
product of the two firms (i.e., the microprocessor plus everything else).
81 
Finally, Intel argued that the conduct at issue occurred in the course of negotiations over 
arrangements to cross-license intellectual property that is necessary to manufacture and sell 
microprocessors.  Hundreds, if not thousands, of patents read on the design and fabrication of 
modern microprocessors.  The ownership of these patents is distributed widely.  It would be 
impossible to make and sell a microprocessor legally without obtaining intellectual property 
rights from many different sources.  The typical way that firms navigate this patent thicket is to 
build their own patent portfolios and enter into cross-licensing arrangements with other firms.
82 
Firms that are in the business of making and selling microprocessors, or making and 
selling systems that incorporate proprietary microprocessor technology, typically have 
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incentives to pursue cross-licensing arrangements, including arrangements with competitors 
who own significant intellectual property rights.  The alternative is to purchase individual 
licensing rights.  Because so many different rights are necessary to make a single 
microprocessor, the negotiation of rights on a case-by-case basis likely would result in the 
payment of very high fees, as each royalty payment pancakes onto the others.  If a firm needs 
hundreds of licenses to make a microprocessor, even a ￿modest￿ royalty of two-tenths of one 
percent of revenues would add crushing and inefficient costs to the total cost of a 
microprocessor.  Cross-licensing arrangements -- in which firms agree to license portfolios of 
intellectual property and net out many of the payments that would be required with individual 
licensing negotiations -- are an efficient alternative to case-by-case licensing. 
Cross-licensing negotiations are often contentious because each party has incentives to 
put high values on its own intellectual property.  Balancing these incentives to disagree is an 
overpowering incentive to reach an agreement when a cross-license is essential for each party￿s 
competitive survival.  However, the need to reach an agreement can be absent if one of the 
parties is not a serious microprocessor supplier.  In this case, the party￿s main objective is to 
obtain value for its intellectual property, not to obtain intellectual property rights to compete as 
a manufacturer or consumer of microprocessors. 
Arguably, this was the case with Intergraph.  Intergraph had manufactured workstations 
using its Clipper microprocessor, which embodied certain patented design features.  At the time 
of its negotiations with Intel, Intergraph was no longer using its Clipper technology, but instead 
had transitioned to use Intel microprocessors in its workstations.  Thus Intergraph was no longer 
in the business of trading IP for IP, but instead was in the business of obtaining maximum value 
for its existing IP. 
This was not the case with Digital.  Digital, although a customer of Intel chips for its 
personal computer business, produced its own Alpha microprocessor in competition with Intel 
for use in servers and workstations.  Nonetheless, a weaker version of the same argument 
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applied, because Intel’s microprocessor business was so much larger in absolute terms than was 
Digital’s Alpha business.
83 
The Compaq story was somewhat different, because Compaq did not contend that Intel’s 
microprocessors infringed its bus patents.  Instead, Compaq contended that the buses used by 
some of Intel’s other customers infringed its patents.  The FTC alleged that Intel used its market 
power in microprocessors to prevent Compaq from gaining an advantage over other personal 
computer manufacturers.  In this way, it could prevent Compaq from appropriating a larger 
share of the revenues jointly produced by a microprocessor and bus. 
Intel and the FTC settled their differences with a consent decree that prevented Intel 
from denying customers access to trade secrets and advanced products unless the customers 
pursued an injunction against Intel that would prevent Intel from selling its products.   
The case of FTC v. Intel raises many important questions at the intersection of antitrust 
and intellectual property.  Was the FTC￿s prosecution of the case consistent with the IP 
Guidelines?  Did the settlement reached in the case properly balance the interests of consumers 
and IP rights-holders?  Does the case suggest changes in Agency guidelines with respect to IP 
licensing that would be desirable? 
The IP Guidelines state:  
Intellectual property law bestows on the owners of intellectual property certain 
rights to exclude others. These rights help the owners to profit from the use of 
their property. An intellectual property owner’s rights to exclude are similar to the 
rights enjoyed by owners of other forms of private property. As with other forms 
of private property, certain types of conduct with respect to intellectual property 
may have anticompetitive effects against which the antitrust laws can and do 
protect. Intellectual property is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny under 
the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them.
84 
The FTC case did not challenge Intel￿s right to refuse to license its intellectual property.  
Rather, the case challenged Intel￿s collateral conduct in response to actual and threatened 
infringement litigation brought by Intergraph, Digital, and Compaq. 
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The IP Guidelines also state that ￿antitrust concerns may arise when a licensing arrangement 
harms competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in 
a relevant market in the absence of the license . . . .￿
85  Intel has the right to deny licenses to its 
intellectual property and to refuse access to its trade secrets.  If a unilateral refusal to license (or 
allow access to trade secrets) is competitively harmful, the effects should be found in markets 
where competition would have occurred in the absence of a license. 
 The FTC’s complaint did not allege that Intel was obligated to supply its trade secrets 
and other competitively sensitive materials to all who would demand them to compete in the 
design and manufacture of microprocessors.  Instead, the FTC’s concern was that Intel withheld 
from its customers information and products that were valuable to those customers in a 
downstream business (personal computers or workstations), with the intent to cause those 
customers to forgo a fair return on their own microprocessor innovations.  According to the 
FTC, Intel’s conduct harmed competition in microprocessor innovation that would have 
occurred in the absence of a license from Intel, because those innovations did not themselves 
depend on the withheld trade secrets.  Intel disagreed with this characterization of its conduct.  
Intel claimed that it had a right to withhold competitively sensitive information, that its conduct 
was appropriate in the context of cross-licensing negotiations, and that its conduct had no 
discernable effect on competition in any market, specifically including the market for 
microprocessor innovation. 
Did the settlement properly balance the interests of consumers and IP rights-holders?  
Both sides presented themselves as champions of intellectual property.  In the FTC’s view, if 
Digital were right that Intel infringed its patents and Digital did not infringe Intel’s patents, it 
ought to be afforded the opportunity to prove that position in court.  It should not be forced by 
Intel’s monopoly position to forgo that right.  Indeed, in the FTC￿s view, it may often be the 
case that the patent system is the strongest line of defense for a small, innovative company 
dealing with a larger, dominant rival. 
Intel, by contrast, argued that its conduct should not have been challenged, and that IP 
rights holders should be able to respond vigorously, even by extrajudicial means, to defend 
themselves against patent litigation.  In particular, Intel argued that it had no obligation to 
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supply sensitive trade secrets to a firm that was attempting to extract huge royalties and was 
seeking an injunction to shut down Intel￿s production.  Furthermore, Intel argued that, by tying 
its hands in patent disputes, the settlement conditions would make it more difficult to reach pro-
competitive cross-licensing agreements.  Most licensing disputes in the semiconductor industry 
end in cross-licensing agreements because failure to obtain access to patent portfolios is 
unacceptable for any party that intends to compete in the industry.  By limiting the ￿damage￿ 
that a party can threaten during the course of a licensing dispute, the FTC￿s terms can 
encourage parties to hold out for better licensing terms, and thereby delay the conclusion of a 
cross-license. 
Licensing of intellectual property that is complementary to or blocks other intellectual 
property is driven by topsy-turvy incentives.  Costs incurred during disputes  encourage the 
quick resolution of those disputes, and the ￿weak￿ can be more powerful than the ￿strong.￿  
Consider two parties, each of which owns a patent that is essential to make a product.  Party A  
needs both patents to sell its products.  With both patents, it has profits of $2 billion per year, 
which are offset by sunk expenditures of $1 billion per year (non-sunk costs are included in  its 
profits).  Without both products, its profit stream is a negative $1 billion per year.  Party B has 
no product, so its profits with or without the patents are the same, and we normalize them to 
zero.  Suppose the parties bargain over licensing arrangements and evenly split the gains from 
sharing their intellectual property.
86   The gains from trade in this example are $2 billion, so the 
licensing arrangement would benefit each party by $1 billion.  Thus, party B would wind up 
with $1 billion and party A would wind up with zero, because its $1 billion share of the gains 
from trade would merely offset its $1 billion of sunk costs. 
This simple example illustrates several important points about licensing complementary 
patents.   The surplus to be divided between the IP rights-holders is the gross surplus excluding 
sunk costs.  The firms are symmetrically situated with respect to claims on this gross surplus, 
even if one of them has no ability to make or sell the products that embody the patents.  In the 
absence of sunk costs, both parties have the same reservation value (zero) if they fail to reach 
an agreement, so both parties would be equally well off when they conclude the bargain.  If one 
of the parties has incurred significant sunk costs to produce a product, these sunk costs 
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disadvantage the party in the patent bargain.  This is the sense in which the ￿weak￿ (party B, 
which has no product) can be more powerful than the ￿strong￿ (party A, which has valuable 
products) in patent bargaining.   
As noted above, many firms own patents that read on microprocessors.  Suppose that ten 
parties each own a patent that is necessary to make and sell a microprocessor.  Assume the 
same numbers as above; i.e., one firm can earn profits of $2 billion with $1 billion in sunk costs 
if it has rights to all the patents, and the other nine firms earn nothing with their patents.  The 
same reasoning as above suggests that each of the nine firms that only own patents can claim 
licensing fees of 1/10 x ($2 billion) = $200 million.  The firm with the sunk costs would be left 
with 1/10 x ($2 billion) - $1 billion, for a net loss of $800 million. 
These examples assume that all sunk costs result from investments necessary to produce 
the product and that no sunk costs result from investments to produce the patented innovation.  
The point remains, however, that in bargaining over the returns from a product that depends 
upon patented inventions held in a large number of different hands, there can be no assurance 
that the distribution of returns will be anywhere near optimal.  In particular, after royalty 
payments to IP rights holders, a firm might have little profit incentive to invest in the facilities 
required to manufacture and sell its product. 
Cross-licensing is an efficient alternative to unilateral royalty obligations.  However, in 
the microprocessor industry, incentives to engage in cross-licensing arrangements are driven by 
the desire to sell products, not by the desire to sell intellectual property.      
The FTC v. Intel settlement was a compromise between the view that cross-licensing 
arrangements are procompetitive and should be encouraged and the view that Intel￿s market 
position requires restraint in responding to challenges of patent infringement lest other 
patentees be deprived of all rewards.  The settlement explicitly gave Intel the right to withhold 
technical information and pre-release products from any party that sought to enjoin Intel￿s sales 
of its microprocessors.  The settlement prohibited such tactics only in response to a suit for 
damages.  Thus the settlement acknowledged that the rewards for other innovators, even if they 
did not produce a product, should not be zero.  It also recognized Intel￿s position that the threat 
of an injunction against an infringer was likely to do more harm than good in this context.  This 
compromise, however, involves a leap of faith that the damages awarded by a patent court will 
not be excessive in light of the potential harm from large, multiple ￿pancaked￿ royalties.        
33 
What does all this imply about the appropriateness of the current IP Guidelines for 
situations such as encountered in the Intel case?  Most significantly, it may say something about 
the limits of the analogy between intellectual property and other forms of property.  As noted 
above,
87 intellectual property differs from other forms of property in several respects, two of 
which are relevant here: (1) the frequency of disputes over the boundaries of each person’s 
property, and (2) the degree to which multiple complements may be necessary in order to 
produce a product.  As a result, appropriate public policy may be exceptionally difficult to 
discern in circumstances like those alleged to have existed in FTC v. Intel.  On the one hand, 
Intel advanced some compelling arguments that patents were a positive hindrance to the very 
existence of a product in this market.  On the other hand, if the FTC were right that Intel was a 
monopolist and was using its monopoly power to prevent other firms from reaping a reward 
from their inventions, it is not at all clear that leaving the patents in place but allowing Intel to 
escape their effects would yield the best possible result. 
 
E.  FTC Generic Drug Cases 
The IP Guidelines recognize that:  
[s]ettlements involving the cross-licensing of intellectual property rights can be an 
efficient means to avoid litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements. When 
such cross-licensing involves horizontal competitors, however, the agencies will 
consider whether the effect of the settlement is to diminish competition among entities 
that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the 
absence of the cross-license.  In the absence of offsetting efficiencies, such settlements 
may be challenged as unlawful restraints of trade.
88 
The FTC has challenged settlements involving owners of drug patents and their generic 
equivalents on three occasions.
89  The first was a settlement between Abbott and Geneva 
involving Hytrin, Abbott￿s brand name hypertension and prostate drug.  The second settlement 
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was between Hoechst Marion Roussel (now Aventis) and the Andrx Corporation involving the 
hypertension and angina drug Cardizem CD.
90  The third involved settlements between 
Schering-Plough and Upshur-Smith and between Schering-Plough and the ESI-Lederle division 
of American Home Products involving the potassium supplement K-Dur.
91  The FTC is also 
investigating an agreement between Bristol-Meyers-Squibb and American Biosciences 
regarding the cancer drug Taxol
92 and the Commission has issued a proposal to conduct a study 
of generic drug competition that would focus on potentially anticompetitive agreements 
between brand-name and generic drug-makers.
93  
The settlements challenged by the FTC relate to provisions created by the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1984 and commonly 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The Act streamlined the approval process for generic 
equivalents of patented drugs by creating the abbreviated new drug application, or ANDA.  The 
ANDA allows generic manufacturers to sidestep the lengthy Federal Drug Administration 
approval process for a new drug by demonstrating that the generic is bioequivalent to an already 
approved drug product (the reference drug).  However the ANDA applicant also must certify 
that the reference drug is not patented, the patent has expired or will expire, or that the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the generic product.  This latter claim is called a ￿Paragraph 
IV￿ certification.  If the applicant makes a Paragraph IV certification, the FDA will stay the 
approval of the ANDA for the earlier of 30 months or the issuance of a non-appealable court 
decision finding the patent invalid or not infringed, provided that the patentee initiates a patent 
infringement suit against the applicant within 45 days from the date of the certification.  
Importantly, the Act also provides that the first applicant to submit an ANDA with a Paragraph 
IV certification is protected from competition from subsequent generic versions of the same 
drug for a period of 180 days.  This 180-day exclusivity lasts from the earlier of (i) the date of a 
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court decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed or (ii) the date the generic 
manufacturer begins marketing the drug. 
The 180-day exclusivity period was intended to encourage generic manufacturers to 
challenge weak drug patents or to design non-infringing drug products by rewarding these firms 
with a period of limited competition.
94  In practice, however, the Act also creates a prime 
opportunity for parties to avoid competition.  The generic company that is the first applicant for 
an ANDA can agree to drop or delay a challenge to the validity of the patent in exchange for 
compensation from the patentee.  This will eliminate competition from the generic company for 
however long the agreement provides.  But this is only the tip of the iceberg.  If the generic 
company also agrees not to relinquish or transfer its entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity 
period, no other firm can market a generic until the first applicant￿s 180-day exclusivity period 
expires.  This could be much later than the earliest date at which a generic supplier could 
survive a preliminary injunction from the patentee. 
The agreements between Abbott and Geneva over Hytrin and between Aventis and 
Andrx over Cardizem CD included the requirements that the generic company not relinquish or 
transfer its right to the 180-day exclusivity period ￿ pending the outcome of the infringement 
suit ￿ and not introduce a bioequivalent product, even if that product did not infringe the 
branded drug￿s patent.  The agreements between Schering-Plough and Upshur-Smith and 
between Schering-Plough and the ESI-Lederle division of American Home Products were final 
settlements of their infringement suits, and provided that Upshur-Smith and ESI would not 
enter until a date certain.  In return for these concessions, Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 
million per month from the date of ANDA approval until there was a district court judgment in 
the parties￿ patent infringement suit and, if Geneva won before the district court, to pay $4.5 
million per month into an escrow account until the final resolution of the litigation.  The latter 
funds would be returned to Abbott if the district court judgment were reversed. Aventis agreed 
to pay Andrx $10 million per quarter beginning with ANDA approval until the earlier of the 
entry of final judgment of the lawsuit or licensing by Aventis of a generic version of Cardizem 
CD.  In addition, the agreement specified that Aventis would pay Andrx an additional $60 
million per year for this period if Aventis should lose the patent suit.  The Commission alleged 
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that the payments to Geneva exceeded the profits it was likely to earn as a supplier of a generic 
form of Hytrin.  According to the complaint, Schering-Plough agreed to pay Upshur-Smith and 
ESI $60 million and up to $30 million, respectively.  In part, these payments were ostensibly for 
licensing certain products to Schering-Plough, but the FTC alleged that the payments were 
unrelated to, and greatly exceeded, the value of those products, if any, to Schering-Plough.  
Based on the allegations in the public record materials, these agreements appear to be 
anticompetitive arrangements to eliminate competition and to divide the monopoly profits of 
successful branded drugs.  The IP Guidelines recognize such hazards and these concerns were 
amplified in a speech by Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein.
95   However, these cases are not 
as simple as they may appear.  Courts recognize the rights of parties in litigation to settle their 
differences privately, and parties may have legitimate interests in a patent settlement that does 
not involve anticompetitive objectives.  Parties have an incentive to negotiate a settlement if the 
total economic value that the parties could achieve in a settlement exceeds the total economic 
value they could achieve by proceeding with litigation.  The settlement value can be higher 
because settling may avoid litigation costs or provide an opportunity for the parties to structure 
arrangements that add social value to the products at issue (such as coordinating the pricing and 
supply of complementary products).  These are potentially procompetitive benefits from settling 
a patent dispute.  Unfortunately, settlement of a patent dispute also involves the welfare of third 
parties (that is, consumers of patented drugs) who have an interest in the outcome of the 
litigation.  Consequently, settlements can be privately profitable, but socially undesirable 
because consumers who may be affected by the settlement are not present at the bargaining 
table. 
The limits placed on the ability of a patentee to settle validity suits affects the protection 
afforded by the patent grant and should be considered in the context of patent policy more 
generally.  Permitting a patentee to settle a dispute over the validity of the patent effectively 
extends the breadth of the patent grant.  If the patent is indeed invalid, settlement allows the 
patentee to reap a reward even though it has failed to achieve a patentable innovation.  On the 
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other hand, prohibiting a settlement incurs the risk that a court may erroneously conclude that a 
patent is invalid.
96  
In response to the FTC￿s complaint, Aventis argued that its actions were a legitimate 
attempt to protect its patent against an infringing product.  According to Aventis, the settlement 
￿was an attempt by the litigants to fashion a negotiated preliminary injunction that would 
prevent [Aventis] from being harmed by the sale of an infringing product during the pendency 
of litigation and would also make Andrx whole for lost profits in the event that its product was 
ultimately determined not to infringe a valid [Aventis] patent.￿ Aventis also claimed that the 
settlement was ￿carefully crafted so as not to remove the incentive from either party to seek and 
obtain a timely judicial resolution of the patent dispute . . . .￿
97  If, in the absence of the 
agreement, a court would have awarded Aventis an injunction to prevent Andrx from marketing 
a generic product before resolution of the patent dispute, and if the settlement did not cause the 
parties to delay the resolution of their dispute, then the settlement would not impose additional 
social costs from Andrx￿s agreement not to market that particular product.  Of course, the 
settlement might impose additional social costs from Andrx￿s agreement not to market another, 
non-infringing, product or to waive its 180-day exclusivity. 
  Clearly there are instances where settlements of patent disputes are socially harmful.  If 
the patent is likely invalid, a settlement can be justified only if the social costs of proving 
invalidity are very large.  Moreover, the requirements that the generic manufacturer not 
introduce a bioequivalent product, even if it does not infringe the patent, and not transfer or 
relinquish the 180-day exclusivity period are difficult to reconcile with economic efficiency.
98 
  FTC Commissioners Anthony and Leary both note that settlements involving patent 
disputes may be procompetitive and caution against blanket prohibitions of such arrangements.  
What can be done to distinguish potentially procompetitive settlements from those that are 
likely to be anticompetitive?  The fact that the settlement involves a payment from the patentee 
to the challenger is not sufficient to determine that the settlement is anticompetitive.  The 
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savings in transactions costs and the risk-allocation benefits could outweigh the potential 
benefits from a finding of invalidity.  Furthermore, parties could attempt to hide payments, for 
example by offering concessions on other products.  We suggest the following factors as a 
guide to assess these settlements.  However, none of these conditions, standing alone, is 
sufficient to determine that a settlement is anticompetitive. 
•  Concerns should be greater if the size of the payment from the patentee to the challenger 
is a large fraction of the monopoly profits from the patented drug.  This would suggest 
that the patentee has a high expectation that the patent is invalid.  
•  Concerns should be greater if the transactions costs that are saved by a settlement are 
small. 
•  Concerns should be greater if the settlement has not been subjected to judicial review 
(and ideally, inspection and comment by third parties). 
•  Concerns should be greater if the patentee would not have been likely to obtain a 
preliminary injunction against the generic challenger. 
•  Concerns should be greater if the terms of the settlement clearly delay the date at which 
a judicial finding of invalidity is likely to occur. 
  
F.  FTC v. Summit Technology and VISX, Inc. 
On March 24, 1998, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against Summit 
Technology and VISX, Inc. for illegal patent pooling, and against VISX for procurement of 
patents by fraud or inequitable conduct.
99  Five months later, it accepted a partial settlement 
dissolving the pool,
100 and later proceeded to trial against VISX on the fraud and inequitable 
conduct claims.  The fraud and inequitable conduct claims were rejected by an Administrative 
Law Judge.
101  
                                                                                                                                                             
98 It is conceivable that these conditions could promote efficiency if they are part of other measures that allow a 
generic supplier to enter at a later date with a more competitive product. 
99 Summit Technology, Inc., Docket. No. 9286 (F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1998 Complaint) (available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/ 9803/summit.cmp.htm). 
100 Summit Technology, Inc., Docket . No. 9286. F.T.C.  Feb. 23, 1999 Agreement Containing Consent Order To 
Cease and Desist (available at  http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/ d09286visxd%26o.htm). 
101 VISX, Inc., Docket No. 9286 (F.T.C. May 27, 1999 Initial Decision) (available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9906/visxid.pdf.)  While the rejection was pending on appeal to the full Commission, 
the Patent And Trademark Office issued a reexamination certificate rejecting all of VISX￿s original patent claims 
but allowing 65 new claims that, in complaint counsel’s view, rendered the fraud and inequitable conduct count  
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According to the complaint, Summit and VISX were the only two firms legally able to 
market laser equipment to be used for photorefractive keratectomy (PRK) ￿ laser vision 
correction ￿ in the United States. The firms placed their patents in a patent pool.  The pool 
established a $250 licensing fee to be paid to the pool each and every time a laser produced by 
either firm was used to perform PRK.  The proceeds from these license fees were then split 
between the two firms according to a predetermined formula.  The effect of this per-procedure 
fee was that neither firm had an incentive to charge doctors less than $250 per procedure. 
  The FTC￿s Analysis To Aid Public Comment acknowledged that, under the IP 
Guidelines, ￿pooling arrangements ￿may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating 
complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and 
avoiding costly infringement litigation￿.￿
102  However, the Analysis went on to note that ￿where 
pooling arrangements ￿are mechanisms to accomplish naked price fixing or market division,￿ or 
where they ￿diminish competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential 
competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the cross-license,￿ they are subject to 
challenge.￿
103 
  Accordingly, in the FTC￿s view, the principal issue was whether the two firms would 
have competed to supply laser vision correction technology absent a license between them.  The 
FTC concluded that the two firms could have and would have competed with one another in the 
absence of the patent pool.
104  Summit and VISX disagreed, arguing that the FTC should accept 
a patent pool as a legitimate means to settle a non-sham infringement dispute, regardless of the 
FTC’s assessment of the underlying merits of the dispute.  The Analysis to Aid Public Comment 
rejected that approach, declaring: 
                                                                                                                                                             
against VISX moot.  (Complaint Counsel’s Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss The Complaint And In 
Response To VISX￿s Motion To Reopen The Record To Receive New Evidence, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9286/991201dismiss.pdf.)  Accordingly, complaint counsel moved for, and 
Commission ordered, dismissal of the complaint.  (Complaint Counsel’s Motion To Dismiss The Complaint, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9286/991201dismiss.pdf; Order Reopening The Record And Dismissing 
The Complaint, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/summitvisxorder.htm (February 7, 2001)).   
102 Analysis, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/d09286ana.htm, quoting IP Guidelines at § 5.5.   
103 Id. quoting IP Guidelines at § 5.5. 
104 The dismissal of the fraud and inequitable conduct count raises an interesting question about the basis for this 
finding.  The FTC’s conclusion that Summit could have competed absent a license to the patents challenged in the 
fraud and inequitable conduct count could only have been based upon four possibilities:  (1) Summit￿s technology 
did not infringe the patent, (2) Summit could have invented around the patent, (3) the patent was unenforceable due 
to fraud upon, or inequitable conduct before, the Patent and Trademark Office, or (4) the patent was invalid or  
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Summit and VISX contended that [the patent pool] reduced the uncertainty and expense 
associated with the patent litigation that would have inevitably ensued without [the 
pool] . . . . Summit and VISX could have achieved these efficiencies by any number of 
significantly less restrictive means, including simple licenses or cross-licenses that did 
not dictate prices to users or restrict entry. 
In other words, once the FTC concluded that the two parties were in fact horizontal 
competitors -- i.e., that they could have competed absent licenses to each other-- then it 
followed that any remaining efficiencies from allowing amicable settlement of patent disputes 
should be balanced against anticompetitive harms in the same manner as other efficiencies.  
This approach seems consistent with a literal reading of the IP Guidelines, which frames the 
issue in terms of whether there would have been competition absent the license.  Moreover, it 
may provide the right incentive -- to avoid excessive restriction on competition -- to the parties, 
who are best positioned to assess whether their respective patent positions truly justify a severe 
restriction on competition.  On the other hand, there is no doubt that this approach places a 
difficult counseling burden on the parties, who must make their decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. 
In evaluating two other examples of patent pooling arrangements -- the MPEG and 
DVD patent pools -- the DOJ reached a different conclusion.  However, these pooling 
arrangements, which we discuss below, included important competitive safeguards. 
 
G.  MPEG and DVD Business Review Letters 
  On June 26, 1997, the DOJ responded to a request by the MPEG LA group
105 for a 
business review letter in connection with the group￿s intention to pool and jointly license 
patents necessary to comply with the MPEG-2 standard.
106  MPEG-2 is a digital technology for 
video compression.  Nine different entities owned patents that were essential to use the MPEG 
technology.  The MPEG group proposed a jointly owned agent (MPEG LA) that would license 
the essential patents as a single package.  The group also would employ an independent patent 
                                                                                                                                                             
unenforceable for other reasons.  Complaint Counsel’s motion to dismiss the complaint casts some doubt upon (1), 
(2), and (3).  
105 MPEG stands for Motion Picture Entertainment Group. 
106 Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein to Garrad R. Beeney, June 26, 1997 (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm).  
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expert to settle disputes over whether a patent is essential for the MPEG technology and 
therefore should be included in the pool. 
  On December 16, 1998, the Antitrust Division issued a similar business review letter in 
connection with the Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) technology.
107  The letter was in response to 
a proposed arrangement that would permit Philips to assemble and offer a package license.  The 
license would include patents owned by Philips, Sony, and Pioneer that were necessary to 
manufacture DVDs and players in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-video formats.     
  The DOJ reacted favorably to both the MPEG and DVD proposals, noting that the 
efficiencies from the proposed arrangements outweighed any risks of competitive harms.  Yet 
other patent pooling arrangements have attracted antitrust scrutiny.  The FTC noted that the 
accumulation of patent rights for gene therapy treatments was a reason to challenge the 
proposed merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz and imposed several licensing requirements before 
approving the merger.  The FTC also objected to the VISX patent pool.  What set the MPEG 
and DVD proposals apart from these other patent pooling arrangements? 
  A key distinction in the MPEG and DVD proposals was the employment of a patent 
expert to make an independent determination of whether patents were essential to use the 
MPEG and the DVD technologies.  Only patents that were essential to use the technology were 
supposed to be included in the pool.  Citing the IP Guidelines, both business review letters 
noted that the pooling of essential patents may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating 
complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and 
avoiding costly infringement litigation.  At the same time, by limiting the pools only to essential 
patents, the arrangement avoids the risk that the pool would eliminate competition between 
technological alternatives.  The combination of patents in the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger 
would not have been limited to those patents that were essential to practice particular gene 
therapies.  Similarly, the VISX pool had no provision to limit the pool to essential patents. 
  The FTC noted that the accumulation of patents in the Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz merger could 
raise barriers to entry even if the patents were complementary.  The merged company might be 
unwilling to license its patents and it would be difficult for competitors to invent around the 
merged company￿s large patent portfolio.  The DOJ concluded that the MPEG and the DVD 
                                                 
107 Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein to Garrad R. Beeney, December 16, 1998 (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm).  
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patent pools did not raise similar concerns.  The pools did not limit the ability of firms to 
license individual patents.  Furthermore, the pools were obligated to offer non-exclusive 
licenses to all takers at non-discriminatory terms and the royalty rates appeared to be small 
relative to the values of the products in which the technologies would be used.  These facts 
appeared to mitigate concerns that the pool might raise barriers to entry or otherwise foreclose 
competition. 
  Following the IP Guidelines, patent pooling arrangements raise concerns if they affect 
competition that would have occurred in the absence of the pool.  The FTC concluded that 
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz could have competed with each other or facilitated competition by 
others if they did not combine their patent portfolios.  Similarly, the FTC concluded that the 
VISX pool eliminated competition that could have occurred in its absence, or at least was not 
structured to avoid such an effect.  In contrast, the MPEG and DVD pools employed safeguards 
to limit the pools to essential patents, which by definition are necessary to practice the 
technology and hence not substitutes for each other.  An additional consideration with respect to 
the MPEG and DVD pools is that the competition that may have occurred in the absence of 
these arrangements would have been a ￿standards war￿ that could have delayed the arrival of 
these technologies, to the detriment of consumers. 
 
V.  IS INNOVATION ￿KING￿ AT THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES? 
  As discussed above, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of antitrust actions 
at the agencies that allege effects on innovation.  The number of merger cases that include 
allegations of innovation effects has increased from only four in the first half of the 1990s to 
forty seven  in the second half of the decade.  Several non-merger civil cases brought in the 
second half of the decade deal directly with innovation effects.   
  However, a closer look shows that a substantial majority of the merger cases that allege 
effects on innovation also exceed the Merger Guidelines thresholds that raise serious concerns 
about competitive effects in markets for existing goods and services.  Assuming that the other 
conditions for sustaining a challenge to a merger were satisfied, such as high barriers to entry, 
these are all transactions that likely would have been challenged without regard to their impacts 
on innovation.  This does not mean that innovation was unimportant in the agencies￿ calculus.   
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It simply means that, had innovation been excluded from the analysis, it is unlikely that in these 
case the enforcement decision would have been different.     
  The eight or so merger cases in which innovation concerns were central to the 
enforcement decision or to the choice of remedies reflect a belief at the agencies that 
competition is good for research and development, just as competition is good for consumers in 
existing product markets.  In this respect, the agencies￿ orientation with respect to innovation 
reinforces their traditional posture with respect to competition in existing product markets.  We 
believe the agencies￿ desire to preserve competition in research and development is appropriate.  
However we also note that the basis for this conclusion is largely anecdotal.  Economic theory 
does not prove that more competition is better for R&D and statistical studies do not support 
that conclusion either.  At the same time, neither economic theory nor statistical studies support 
a conclusion that highly concentrated markets promote R&D, and there is considerable 
anecdotal evidence to the contrary. 
  Innovation concerns have been central to several enforcement decisions by the agencies 
in the civil non-merger area.  The DOJ and the district court noted that Microsoft￿s conduct 
deterred innovation in the computer industry.  But Microsoft￿s exclusionary contracts with 
original equipment suppliers, Internet service providers, and Internet content providers, likely 
would have gotten the company in hot antitrust water without regard to innovation issues.  The 
Microsoft case does raise innovation-related issues that future guidelines should address.  
Network effects were an important element in the Microsoft case.  Network effects contributed 
to high barriers to entry in the market for personal computer operating system software and 
Microsoft￿s challenged conduct was designed to protect these high barriers to entry by 
undermining the competitive significance of alternative technologies, such as browsers and the 
Java language, that are not specific to the Windows platform.   
  Innovation was central to the government￿s case against Visa and MasterCard.  That 
case focuses on structural conditions in the credit card industry that limit innovation by the two 
dominant credit card companies.  Other cases, such as the FTC challenges of settlements with 
generic drug competitors and the DOJ￿s business reviews of the MPEG and DVD patent pools, 
deal squarely with innovation issues and particularly the intersection of intellectual property 
rights and the antitrust laws.  
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  Based on mere numbers, innovation has not been ￿King￿ at the antitrust agencies.  Most 
cases brought by the agencies are decided by anticipated price impacts in traditional goods 
markets.  However, innovation concerns have been critical in a handful of merger cases and in 
several prominent non-merger cases.  These enforcement actions have dealt with competition 
issues that have profound consequences for consumers.  In this respect, the status of innovation 
competition as a dimension of antitrust enforcement has been elevated dramatically in the latter 
half of the 1990s, and we believe appropriately so. 
 
VI.  HAVE THE AGENCIES￿ ACTIONS BEEN CONSISTENT WITH THE 
GUIDELINES, AND IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED? 
We are not aware of any antitrust action by the agencies since 1995 that was plainly 
inconsistent with the IP Guidelines.  The IP Guidelines state:  
The competitive effects of licensing arrangements often can be 
adequately assessed within the relevant markets for the goods 
affected by the arrangements.  In such instances, the agencies will 
delineate and analyze only goods markets.  In other cases, 
however, the analysis may require the delineation of markets for 
technology or markets for research and development (innovation 
markets).
108 
The agencies￿ actions with respect to mergers and acquisitions have been 
consistent with this principle.  The agencies generally have analyzed the effects 
of mergers and acquisitions in goods markets when such markets have been 
sufficient to address the likely competitive effects of the transactions.  Only a 
few merger cases have required an independent analysis of competitive effects in 
innovation markets. 
  The IP Guidelines also state that ￿[t]he agencies will delineate an innovation market 
only when the capabilities to engage in the relevant research and development can be associated 
with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms.￿  Again, the agencies￿ conduct 
appears to have been consistent with this statement.  In the  handful of merger cases since 1995 
                                                 
108 IP Guidelines at § 3.2.  
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that specifically address innovation markets, the parties to the merger all possessed specialized 
assets or characteristics that distinguished them from other potential innovators.  Glaxo, 
Wellcome, Ciba-Geigy, and Sandoz were distinguished from their competitors by the fact that 
each had engaged in substantial R&D and each had products that were part way through the 
FDA pipeline for the approval of drugs.  That was also true for the markets in which Upjohn 
and Pharmacia, American Home Products and American Cyanamid, and Baxter and Immuno 
were R&D competitors.  The R&D assets controlled by these companies are specific to 
particular innovative activities and would be difficult for others to replicate.  Lockheed Martin 
and Northrop Grumman also had characteristics that distinguished them from other innovators 
of defense weapons systems.  Such innovation requires specialized assets that are possessed by 
only a few firms.   
  The agencies￿ enforcement decisions in civil non-merger cases since 1995 appear 
consistent with the IP Guidelines, although they also raise issues that are not addressed in the 
guidelines.  A case in point is the FTC action with respect to Dell Computer.  The FTC 
initiative prevented Dell from exercising market power that it obtained by failing to disclose its 
intellectual property.  Users of the VL-bus standard would have been locked into a dependence 
on Dell￿s intellectual property.  Antitrust practitioners and the business community would 
benefit from a discussion of the characteristics of lock-in and its implications for antitrust 
policy in standard-setting. 
  The IP Guidelines￿ discussion of patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements is 
broadly consistent with the actions of the DOJ and the FTC with respect to the MPEG, DVD, 
and VISX patent pools.  The IP Guidelines, together with the DOJ business review letters for 
the MPEG and DVD pools, appear to provide sound guidance for antitrust enforcement for 
patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements.  
  One area for which guidance would be very useful is in the settlement of patent 
disputes.  The FTC￿s challenges to the patent settlements between Aventis and Andrx, Abbott 
and Geneva, Schering-Plough and Upshur-Smith, and Schering-Plough and American Home 
Products indicate a new and important trend in antitrust enforcement involving intellectual 
property.  The patent settlement cases are not fully anticipated by the IP Guidelines, although 
they appear to be generally consistent with those guidelines.  The guidelines focus upon 
whether there would have been competition absent a license.  The patent settlement cases deal  
46 
with efforts to forestall the possibility of competition, under circumstances in which it is 
difficult to predict whether such competition would have emerged or instead would have been 
enjoined absent the conduct.  Based on the publicly available materials, the enforcement actions 
in these three cases appear generally appropriate to prevent conduct that would be detrimental 
to consumers.  However, they have to be reconciled with the objectives of protecting the 
freedom of litigation parties to settle their disputes and permitting patentees to enforce valid 
patent rights.  Clearly, more advice is needed in this important area.   
  The FTC￿s case against Intel raises important issues that bear on cross-licensing and the 
settlement of patent disputes.  The IP Guidelines state that the mere possession of market power 
that arises in the connection of intellectual property or any other form of property does not 
violate the antitrust laws.   
Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property owner an 
obligation to license the use of that property to others.  As in other antitrust 
contexts, however, market power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, 
even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an 
intellectual property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in 
connection with such property.
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  This advice is sufficiently ambiguous to allow broad discretion for intervention, such as 
that which occurred in FTC v. Intel.  A key issue with regard to unilateral licensing should be 
the extent to which a company uses its market power in a way that discourages innovation 
generally.  This is an innovation markets analysis.  The issue was raised in the Intel case, and 
the parties disagreed as to its impacts. 
  The FTC’s actions in the Intel case apply to a situation to which the IP Guidelines had 
devoted relatively little attention: what appropriate ways exist to deal with situations in which 
patents are so numerous and widely distributed that it becomes difficult to produce a product at 
all without infringement?  Future guidelines would provide a service by elaborating on the 
benefits of cross-licensing arrangements in these circumstances and on the range of permissible 
conduct in the course of cross-licensing negotiations. 
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